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Jurisdiction of State Regulatory Commissions
Over Public Utility Holding Company
Diversification
INTRODUCTION

The energy industry and numerous critical observers are currently engaged in a debate over the role of state public service
commissions in regulating a recent but widespread phenomenon:
diversification of public utility companies.1 Although historically
utilities have not been thought of as diversification candidates,
inflationary pressures in recent decades have caused many utilities to expand into unregulated, non-utility areas of business.2 A
common mechanism for implementing such diversifications is
the organization of a holding company3 to act as a parent4 for
the utility, thereby allowing for the creation of non-utility subsidiaries.5 While holding companies are legal entities which can
1. Any business activity that falls outside ordinary utility functions is considered
diversified activity. Traditional utility functions include generation, transmission, and
distribution of commodities such as electricity and gas. Ferrar, Business Diversification:
An Option Worth Considering,PUB. UTIL FORT., Jan. 7, 1982, at 17.
See generally J. MAIKO, G. ENHOIA & T. JAI)TZ, ENERGY UTIITY DIVERSIFICAITON,
Hoi.)ING COMPANIES, ANi) REGULATION (1981); NATIONAL, ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY
UTILITY COMMISSIONERS, 1982 REPORT OF THE Ai) Hoc COMMITTEE ON UTIIiTY DIVERSIFI.

CATION (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 REPORT]; York & Malko, Utility Diversification:A
Regulatory Perspective,PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 6, 1983, at 15.

2. See Lewis & Ross, A Road Map for Utility Diversification,PUB. UTIL. FORT., Dec. 23,
1982, at 17.
3. Holding companies are corporations organized for the purpose of acquiring and
holding the stock of other corporations. Corporations that engage in business activities
and only incidentally hold majority stock in another corporation are not holding companies. 6A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2821
(1981). In North Am. Co. v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 327 U.S. 686 (1945), the Court
noted that "the dominant characteristic of a holding company is the ownership of securities by which it is possible to control or substantially to influence the policies and management of one or more operating companies in a particular field of enterprise." Id. at
701. See generally U.S. GOV'T PRTG. OFF., LAWS REI.ATING TO SECURITIES COMMISSION
EXCHANGES ANi) HOLDING COMPANIES (1981).

4. A corporation that has either direct or indirect power to elect a majority of the
directors of another corporation is deemed a parent corporation over the corporation it
controls. The terms "holding company" and "parent company" are frequently used interchangeably. H. BALlANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 134 (1946).
5. When the majority of a corporation's stock is held by a parent company, the corpor
ation held is termed a "subsidiary." 6A W. F.ETCHER, supra note 3, at § 2821. The hold-
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serve as useful constructs for implementing diversification, they
can also present stumbling blocks to public service commissions
charged with the duty of regulating utilities. The primary problem is that public service commissions frequently lack the jurisdiction to review holding and subsidiary company decisions
6
directly affecting the utilities involved.
Furthermore, critics of unregulated utility diversification fear
that it will occur at the expense of utility ratepayers if ratepayers are forced to pay for diversification in the form of higher
rates or substandard utility service. 7 While shareholders, especially the large institutional investors which dominate the utility
stock market,8 can sell their stock if they see the non-utility
endeavors failing, ratepayers cannot usually extricate themselves
because they are locked into the utility's service territory. 9
This note examines state public service commission jurisdiction over diversification activity by public utility holding companies in Michigan, Illinois, New York, and Connecticut. In all
four states, the decline of corporate and industrial activity spurred
the development of a diversification strategy as a profit enhancing course. The cases examined are a representative sampling,
exemplifying the range of public service commission responses
to diversification by public utility holding companies.1 0 The Pub-

ing company is regarded as an entity separate from its subsidiary. Accordingly, the business transactions of the subsidiary are not generally attributed to the holding company.
Id. In appropriate circumstances, however, a subsidiary can maintain an action against
its holding company based on a breach of fiduciary relationship. 13 W. FLETCHER, supra
note 3, at § 5888 (1980 & Supp. 1983).
6. See infra notes 47-100 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 41.
8. See Disclosure of Corporate Ownership Before the Senate Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations, and Budgeting, Management, and Expenditures of the Comm. on
Government Operations,93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974).
9. See infra note 41-42.
10: For examples of other states' treatment of public utility holding company issues,
see Montana Power Company v. Public Service Commission, No. 47969 (Dist. Ct. of
Lewis Clark County, Mont. Aug. 12, 1982); Application of Honolulu Gas Co. for Authorization to Execute a Plan of Reorganization Agreement of Merger, No. 2762 (Pub. Utils.
Comm'n of Hawaii May 27, 1971); Motion of the Comm'n as to the Financial Condition of
Jamaica Water Supply Co., No. 26569 (New York Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar. 9, 1976);
Application by Duke Power Co. for Authority to Adjust its Elec. Rates Charges Based
Solely Upon Changes in the Cost of Fuel, No. E-7, sub. 243 (N.C. Utils. Comm'n Mar. 31,
1978); Application of Cream Valley Tel. Co., No. 2-U-7383 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Jan.
28, 1974).
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lic Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,11 the federal act designed to regulate public utility holding companies with interstate operations is then examined as one potential alternative
treatment of public holding company diversification. Finally, the
note proposes a state legislative response designed to promote
equitable state regulation of public utility holding companies.
BACKGROUND
Public Utility Regulation
A public utility may be defined as any enterprise subject to longterm governmental regulation for the purpose of consumer protection. 12 One feature which characterizes a utility is the general
public's need for the utility's service. Another is the utility's possession of certain technical characteristics that lead almost inevitably to monopoly.' 3 Utilities have existed from the first time the
general public demanded a product or service held by another as a
natural monopoly. 4 The existence of public utilities is now wide-

11. 15 U.S.C. § 79a-26 (1982).
12. J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPIES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 4 (1961). The purpose of public
utility regulation is to protect the public in its collective role as consumer, as opposed to
the public as taxpayer or producer. Id. A public utility is also defined as a business or
service engaged in the business of supplying consumers with goods or services which are
required on a continual basis. U.S. DEPT. oF ENERGY, A CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO THE ECONOMICS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY RATEMAKING 213 (1980) [hereinafter cited as CONSUMER'S
GUIDE].
Economists categorize utilities into three groups: energy, communications, and transportation. Some types of utilities are considered partially competitive (railroads, waterways, pipelines, cable television), while others are considered primarily monopolies (telephone service, electric power, natural gas, sewage). C. Wil.COx & W. SHEPHERD, PUBIIC
POLICIES TOWARD BUSINESS 334 (5th ed. 1975).
13. J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 12, at 4.

14. The term "natural monopoly" describes a business which cannot operate efficiently unless it operates as a monopoly because of the business's inherent technical
characteristics. The "natural monopoly" status of public utilities is due primarily to the
industry's severely localized market. J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 12, at 11-12. Some economists question whether technology has not rendered "natural" monopolies impotent,
arguing, for example, that copy-by-wire is a competitive alternative to the postal monopoly. Stelzer, A Policy Guide for Utility Executives: "Know When to Hold 'em; Know When
to Fold 'em," PUB. UTIL. FORT., Oct. 9, 1980, at 62.
Utilities date at least as far back as 2300 B.C., when Hammurabi promulgated his code
fixing yearly rates for the hiring of ships. I A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY
REGULATION -THEORY AND APPI.ICATION 5 (1969). Priest notes that the first public utility
may have far predated Hammurabi's Code if one includes in the class the serpent whose
natural monopoly over the fruit trade was plied to over half of the world's then existing
population. Id. Accord Genesis 3:1-7.
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spread, supplying the public with everything from telephone ser15
vice and natural gas to waterways and cable television.
Public utilities have been subject to regulation since 1670, when
Lord Chief Justice Hale of Britain noted the need for monitoring
port facilities and ferry boat businesses.1 6 According to Hale,
these operations required regulatory review because they were
businesses "affected with a publick interest."1' 7 By the 19th century in America, however, only a handful of states had imposed
public utility commission oversight of utilities, and those that
18
undertook utility review did so on an advisory basis.
Then, in 1876, the Supreme Court, in the landmark case of
Munn v. Illinois,19 affirmed the rights of states to regulate private businesses affected with a public interest.2 0As a result, by
21
the 1930's, most states had created public service commissions.
Many utilities even lobbied for these commissions, preferring
state regulation to federal regulation or public ownership. 22

15. C. WILCOX & W. SHEPHERD, supra note 12, at 334. Utility systems generally
undergo four states of development. In the first stage, the system is invented. In the
second stage, the system experiences further growth and seeks regulation as a means of
attaining legitimacy and permanence. The third stage is characterized by the utility's
switch to a defensive posture as the utility encounters objection to high rates and as the
utility competes against technological breakthroughs that would render at least some
utility services useless. In the fourth stage of utility development, the utility may yield to
competitive pressures and revert to conventional competitive processes. Id. at 348-49.
16. C. WILCOX & W. SHEPHERD, supra note 12, at 353.
17. Id. This notion of the public interest in utility regulation has been the focal point
of subsequent utility legislation. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). See also Arnebergh,
Public Utilities Regulation and the Community Interest, 30 S. Cal. L. Rev. 191 (1957)
(arguing that the public interest must be protected by regulation when a necessary good
or service is provided to the public by a monopoly).
18. C. WILCOX & W. SHEPHERD, supra note 12, at 353. During this period, advisory
bodies depended upon the combined effects of competition and supervision to exert a
regulatory effect upon utilities.
19. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
20. The Supreme Court reasoned:
Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to
make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in
effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has
thus created.
Id. at 126.
21. C. WILCOX & W. SHEPHERD, supra note 12, at 354.
22. Id. Utilities preferred state regulation because until the 1930's, state public service
commissions had little leverage and were considered passive bodies. Modem state public
service commissions have their critics as well, who characterize the regulatory bodies as

19831

Public Utility Diversification
Utility Diversification

Prior to the mid 1970's, public utilities experienced steady and
substantial profits coupled with slowly rising costs. 23 Increases in
the rates they charged, however, were rare, and rate hearings were
26
25
few and far between. 24 With the onset of inflation, cost increases, 27
and sharp decreases in the growth of service demand,
however, many public utilities began to see their financial positions deteriorate. 28 In response, some public utilities diversified
into unregulated non-utility areas. 29 This strategy enabled the util-

reacting passively to complaints instead of acting affirmatively to ensure quality service.
These critics allege that commissions' weaknesses include easy acceptance of utilities'
cost analyses, failure to audit utilities' accounting systems, failure to control utility operating expenses, and unwillingness to govern utility earnings by prescribing criteria of
equity or efficiency. Id.
23. Id. at 375.
24. Id. Economists have referred to the period from 1945 to 1965 as the "golden age of
regulation."
25. Financial problems engendered by soaring costs, decreased demand, emerging
competition, and "disappointing" rate hikes have caused many utilities to consider diversification as a possible solution. Lewis & Ross, supra note 2, at 17. See also NORTH AM.

ELEc.

RELIABILITY COUNCIL, 11TH ANNUAL REVIEW OF OVERALL REILIABILITY & ADEQUACY OF

THE N. AM. BULK POWER SYSTEMS 4 (1981); Ferrar, supra note 1, at 13. Nonetheless,
utilities' financial problems must be kept in perspective. Utilities have fared better in
recent years than the transportation, steel production, and automobile manufacturing
industries. 1982 REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.
26. In the electric utility industry, for example, construction costs rose from $13.4 billion in 1972 to $25.7 billion in 1980. It is further estimated that construction costs will
reach $35 billion in 1985. CABOT CONSULTING GROUP, DIVERSIFICATION IN THE UTILITY
INDUSTRY 2-3 (1982) (quoting EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE STATISTICAL YEARBOOK FOR

1980, Table 50). Increased costs are attributable to inflation, high interest rates, stricter
environmental controls, and other regulatory requirements. Id. (quoting Bus. WK., Feb.
23, 1981, at 76-86).
27. In the wake of the Arab oil embargo, utilities passed on to consumers the substantially elevated cost of fuel. CONSUMER'S GUIDE, supra note 12, at 160. Demand statistics
reflect consumers' response. During the 1960's, gross energy consumption in the residential sector grew an average of 4.6% annually. This contrasts with the 1.9% average
annual rates since then. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ANALYSIS OF TRENDS IN RESIDENTIAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION i (1981).
28. As inflation has continually eroded interest coverage ratios for utilities since the
1960's, bond rating agencies have responded by downgrading utility bond ratings and
other security ratings. This trend began in earnest in 1972. Accordingly, in the electric
utility industry, stocks have sold below book value since 1973. BOoz-ALLEN & HAMILTON
INC., THE FINANCIAL HEALTH OF THE ELEC. UTIL. IND. I-1, 1-7 (Oct., 1982) (prepared for the
U.S. Department of Energy).

29. An Edison Electric Institute survey identified 286 diversified businesses in the
electric utility industry. Sixty percent of the ventures were related (vertically integrated)
to power production, while the remaining ventures reportedly were based on utility exper-

tise. NATIONAL

ASsoc. OF REGULATORY UTIL. PUBLIC COMMENT & TESTIMONY, COMM'N, PRE-
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ities to attempt to profit by operating their subsidiary businesses
30
free from local regulation.
Utility diversification is generally structured in one of three
ways. 31 First, a utility can diversify by creating a new division
within its utility structure. 32 The operations of such a division will
usually fall within the jurisdiction of a public service commission
because the division is still a part of the regulated utility. Second,
a utility can diversify by creating a subsidiary whose non-utility
operations may or may not fall within the jurisdiction of a public
service commission, depending on state law and the manner in
which the subsidiary is structured.3 3 Third, a utility may diversify

LIMINARY OFFICIAL REPORT, AD Hoc COMMMTEE ON UTILITY DIVERSIFICATION 5 (Nov.,
1982) (comment by the Edison Electric Institute) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC COMMENT].

In the natural gas industry, 82% of the gas companies responding to a recent American
Gas Association survey were diversified. Forty-nine of the companies' diversified ventures were functionally related activities, 50 were directly related to the gas utility business, and 39 were ventures unrelated to the gas industry. Id. at 27 (comment by the
American Gas Association). Gas company non-utility activities include real estate development, computer services, banking, insurance, and chemical production. Id.
Electric utilities' non-utility ventures includes fuel exploration and development, conservation technology, load management, appliance sales and service, district heating,
real estate transactions, co-generation, fish-farming, synfuels development, computer
software, graphic arts, timber harvesting, the provision of "chilled water service" to
shopping centers, short-line railroads, public shipping terminals, scientific testing, commercial paper marketing, "energy education services," cattle ranching, and the selling of
vanadium from their own uranium mines. DiversificationFever-UtilitiesSeek Greener
Pastures,POWERLINE, Oct., 1981, at 6 [hereinafter cited as DiversificationFever]. See also
Pacific Power & Light: Still diversifying as electric use slows, Bus. WK., Jan. 18, 1982, at
56 [hereinafter cited as Pacific Power & Light]; Diversification is Broad Trend, CEO
Hines Says, ELEC. LIGHT & POWER, June, 1982, at 3.
30. Diversification can improve a utility financially because it can both decrease risk
and increase earnings levels and thus enhance the utility's securities. CABOT CONSULTING
GROUP, supra note 26, at ii. Some critics of diversification argue that individual investors,
through discriminating portfolio selection, can reduce risk more efficiently than the utilities through diversification. See PUBLIC COMMENT, supra note 29 (comment by G. Sterzinger, of the National Consumer Law Center).
Nonetheless, as a result of diversification, energy businesses have experienced better
earnings, sturdier credit ratings, more marketable securities, and higher market-to-book
and price-earning ratios. Lewis & Ross, supra note 2, at 17. For example, in the electric
utility industry, studies have shown that diversification can boost return on investment
by 10 to 20%. PUBLIC COMMENT, supra note 32, at 16 (comment by the Edison Electric
Institute).
31. J. MALKO, G. ENHOLM & T. JADITZ, supra note 1, at 9. A recent Edison Electric
Institute survey found that of 247 non-utility ventures in the electric industry, 143 were
organized as subsidiaries. The survey did not distinguish between holding company subsidiaries and utility-owned subsidiaries. Id. at 10.
32. Id. at 9.
33. For example, when the Southern Connecticut Gas Company decided to enter the
business of drilling and exploring for natural gas, it created two subsidiaries to undertake
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by organizing a holding company to act as parent over the utility and its subsidiaries. 34 This often allows the utility to avoid
regulation of its subsidiary because if the existence of the subsidiary as a separate company. Some states, however, allow limited
jurisdiction over holding companies to the extent that they have
transaction with public utility subsidiares under "affiliated inter35
ests" statutes.
The underlying purpose of utility diversification through the
creation of a holding company is usually two-fold: to enhance the
utility's financial opportunities, 36 and to avoid public service com-

the venture. The Public Utilities Control Authority, in its decision permitting the creation
of holding companies, specified which subsidiaries should remain Southern subsidiaries,
rather than holding company subsidiaries.
34. J. MALKO, G. ENHOI.M & T. JAn ITZ, supra note 1, at 9.
35. Affiliated interestsstatutes extend public service commission jurisdiction by giving commissions authority to monitor transactions between utilities and corporations or
persons who have limited authority over the utility. "Authority" is statutorily defined; it
generally means control through stock ownership. The Illinois "affiliated interests" statute is typical:
(2) The Commission shall have jurisdiction over affiliated interests having
transactions, other than ownership of stock and receipt of dividends thereon,
with public utilities under the jurisdiction of the Commission, to the extent of
access to all accounts and records of such affiliated interests, relating to such
transactions ... [t]he phrase "affiliated interests" means:
(a) Every corporation and person owning or holding, directly or indirectly,
0ff%or more of the voting capital stock of such public utility;
(b) Every corporation and person in any chain of successive ownership of
10% or more of voting capital stock;
(c) Every corporation, 10% or more of whose voting capital stock is owned by
any person or corporation owning 10% or more of the voting capital stock of
such public utility, or by any person or corporation in any such chain of
successive ownership of 10% or more of voting capital stock;
(g) Every corporation or person which the Commission may determine as a
matter of fact after investigation and hearing is actually exercising any
substantial influence over the policies and actions of such public utility even
though such influence is not based upon stock holding, stockholders, directors or officers to the extent specified in this Section....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-2/3, § 8a (1981).
Other states have also enacted affiliated interest statutes. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 1213 (1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 104 (1978 & Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 216B.48 (West 1947 & Supp. 1982); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 366:1 (1966 & Supp. 1981);
N.Y. PUB. SERv. LAW § 110 (McKinney 1955 & Supp. 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-51
(1982); OR. REV. STAT. § 757.495 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 2101 (Purdon 1979 &
Supp. 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-3-27 (1977); VA. CODE § 56-76 (1981 & Supp. 1983); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 80.16 (1962 & Supp. 1982); Wis. SAT. ANN. § 196.52 (West 1957 & Supp.
1982).
36. See supra note 30.
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mission review. 37 Whether the former purpose is met by diversification is uncertain. 38 As to the second purpose of diversificationavoidance of regulatory jurisdiction-few states have reviewed
their public utility laws to determine whether amendment is
necessary.39 As a result, some public service commissions have

37. The Illinois statute providing for the creation of a public service commission is
typical. Section 1 of the Illinois Public Utilities Act states, "There is created an Illinois
Commerce Commission consisting of 5 members nor more than 3 of whom shall be
members of the same political party at the time of appointment." I. REV. STAT. 111 2/3,
§ 1 (1981). The Act grants the Illinois Commerce Commission jurisdiction over utilities'
power to issue stocks (§ 20), to pay dividends (§ 27a), to change rates (§ 36), and to abandon or discontinue service (§ 49a).
For examples of other state statutes creating public service commissions over public
utilities, see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-1 (West 1960 & Supp. 1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 460.4 (1970 & Supp. 1983); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW art. 1, § 4 (McKinney 1955 &
Supp. 1982).
38. A number of utilities have clearly benefitted by diversifying. For example, one of
the most highly diversified utilities, Pacific Power & Light Co., derives nearly half of its
net income from its nonutility subsidiaries. Pacific Power & Light, supra note 29, at 56.
Pacific's holdings include the largest investor-owned electric power system in the Northwest, the sixth largest independent telecommunications operation in the country, the
eighth largest coal mining company in the country, ventures into gold and other rare
mineral concerns, cable television properties, and commercial background music businesses. The company holds over thirty subsidiaries. Pacific's consolidated revenue
increased nearly 200% from 1975 to 1980. EDISON EL.ECTRIC INSTITUTE, ECONOMICS DivISION. CASE STUDIES IN Ei,EC. UTII,. DIVERSIFICATION (Feb., 1982). Some economists, however, question whether utilities have the level of management and the aggressive characteristics suited to compete outside their structural monopolies. One economist stated that
the benefits of diversification may be marginal because investors have not generally
greeted diversified companies with enthusiasm and because the economic benefits that
accrued to those companies which diversified successfully in the past have changed. The
economist suggests that regulatory oversight will curtail the downside risks of diversification borne by ratepayers. Diversification and Deregulation: Complements or Substitutes?, Address by Judith H. Greenman, Senior Consultant, National Economic Research
Associates, Inc., to The Annual Conference of the Public Utility Research Center (Feb. 3,
1982), reproducedin PUBILIC COMMENT, supra note 29, at 239.
Another economist has suggested that the stock market will fail to respond favorably
to diversification unless utilities diversify into complementary operations, taking advantage of utility management's area of expertise and enhancing both operations' overall
performance. An example of such a diversification would be an electric utility's use of its
experience in stringing wires and connecting them to homes to perform similar services
in the cable television field. Another example would be a utility's marketing of its computer models used to forecast regional economies. Conerly, Diversification:An Economic
Framework for Analysis, PI. UTII.. FORT., Sept. 16, 1982, at 40. See generally Utility
Diversification:Not A Fast Track To The PromisedLand, EI.EC. WK., Feb. 15, 1982, at 9.
39. Although several states have addressed the diversification issue in administrative
proceedings, only Connecticut and Maine have enacted statutes that begin to address the
issue adequately. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-47 (West 1960 & Supp. 1982); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 104 (1978 & Supp. 1982).
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been unable to deal with the consequences of diversification. 40
This concerns industry critics, who fear that financial improvement through unregulated diversification will come at the expense
of utility ratepayers. 41 Additionally, although diversification is
indirectly subsidized by ratepayers when utility capital is used to

40. In Illinois, the Illinois Commerce Commission concluded that it lacked jurisdiction
over a utility holding company's maneuver calculated to avoid the language of the Illinois regulatory statute. See infra notes 72-100 and accompanying text.
In Connecticut, the public service commission set an example for dealing with diversification ex post facto, although the commission was unable to involve itself until the
diversification was already accomplished and ratepayers had been forced to absorb the
costs. See infra notes 118-48 and accompanying text.
In New York, the public service commission avoided the jurisdictional question by
flatly but perhaps short-sightedly refusing to allow diversification through the holding
company arrangement. See infra notes 101-17 and accompanying text.
Finally, the inability of the Michigan public service commission to exercise jurisdiction
over a utility's pre-divestiture conduct resulted in the displacement of valuable utility
assets. See infra notes 48-71 and accompanying text.
41. With the holding company structure, possible dangers include managerial dilution
as the more talented managers are transferred to the more competitive non-utility operations, profit skimming from the utility to the holding company, and favored treatment of
the non-utility's goods and services by the utility, any of which could result in the erosion
of utility service quality. DiversificationFever, supra note 29, at 7 (quoting Peter Anderson of Wis. ENVTL DECADE). Other threats include the possibility that utilities may be
wrongfully charged for non-utility costs, and risks and losses might be absorbed by the
utility while profits are kept from them. PUBLIC COMMENT, supra note 29, at 3 (comment
by G. Sterzinger of the National Consumer Law Center). See generally 1980 REPORT,
supra note 1. Utility services could also deteriorate if retained earnings were passed from
the utility to the holding company and subsequently diverted to more profitable ventures
than service maintenance or upgrading. In future reorganizations, financial and physical
assets attributable to the regulated portion of the business may be unequally divided in
favor of the nonregulated portion. Interview with Dr. Alvin K. Grandys, Director of the
Governor's Office of Consumer Services for the State of Illinois, in Chicago (Aug. 5, 1983).
Two examples of the dangers that public utility diversification may hold recently
occurred in Cook County, Illinois. On May 5, 1982, the State's Attorney of Cook County
filed suit in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging that Peoples
Energy Corporation's diversification program and subsequent divestiture defrauded consumers. The State's Attorney charged that defendants diverted over $100,000,000 derived
from rate increases and used this revenue to finance non-utility ventures, thereby undercapitalizing the utilities. As a result of the undercapitalization, the State's Attorney
charged, the utilities requested (and received) from the Illinois Commerce Commission a
rate hike of approximately 50% in 1982. County of Cook v. MidCon Corp., No. 82 C2803
(N.D. Ill. filed May 5, 1982). (This suit was dismissed by the federal district court on
November 8, 1983, on the ground that the Circuit Court of Cook County had already
decided the issue in defendants' favor. See infra notes 72-100 and accompanying text.)
In its study of gas pipeline safety in Chicago, the Labor Coalition on Public Utilities
also charged that Peoples Energy Corp. and Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. drained their
gas utility of ratepayer capital which should have been used to improve gas distribution
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fund the enterprise, 42 ratepayers may pay an even greater price in
the form of higher rates while non-utility operations flourish.43 Further,
absent regulatory oversight, it is not clear how ratepayers can be
protected from holding company accounting abuses such as
44
unrecorded cross-subsidization among subsidiaries.
State public service commissions are in many instances powerless to take remedial action, because the business activities of the
public utility holding companies and their non-utility subsidiaries
frequently fall outside the jurisdiction of public service commissions. 45 This is due to the fact that neither the holding company
nor the subsidiary is engaged in utility activity. Typically, public
service commissions exercise jurisdiction over utilities' requests for
rate hikes, stock issues, and a variety of other business transactions. 46 While this range of jurisdiction was formerly sufficient
to protect the public interest, diversification in the public utility
industry appears to necessitate broadening commissions' traditional role to the extent that the activity of unregulated subsidiaries affects utility rates and services.

system safety. Thirty-four people were seriously injured between 1975 and 1981 as a
result of leaking gas in Chicago. Eleven of the accidents involved cast iron mains,
seventy-five per cent of which were installed prior to 1930. The estimated useful life of
cast iron mains, once thought to be seventy-five years, has been adjusted downward to
fifty years.
Further, property damage caused by gas leaks has increased. A comparison with other
urban gas system property reports indicates that Chicago has experienced nearly twice
as much property damage as the next closest urban area. LABOR COALITION ON PUBLIC
UTILITIES, ANALYSIS OF CHICAGO GAS INE SAFETY 1975-1981, at 9, 18, 33 (Aug. 30, 1982).
42. David E. Stahr of the Illinois Public Action Council charged that although ratepayer capital was used to fund the MidCon Corp. non-utility ventures, ratepayers were
not permitted to share in the benefits: "The real question is to what extent... a public
utility [can] be used to build a private empire." DiversificationFever, supra note 29, at 7.
The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners has stated that the
financing of non-utility ventures by the sale of utility securities represents an indirect
subsidization by ratepayers. Under these circumstances, ratepayers should share in the
diversified earnings. 1982 REPORT, supra note 1, at 8.
43. 1982 REPORT, supra note 1, at 8.
44. Cross-subsidization, in the context of utility diversification, is the subsidization of
a non-utility by a utility or vice-versa. Cross-subsidization is usually accomplished by
charging non-utility expenses to the utility, or by paying non-utility personnel from utility funds. Some argue that organizing holding companies over utility and non-utility
subsidiaries makes it easier to detect cross-subsidization. CABOT CONSULTING GROUP,

supra note 26, at 81-85. Of course, nothing prevents cross-subsidization if the holding
company sanctions it.
45. See infra notes 72-100.
46.

See supra note 37.
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STATES' RESPONSES TO UTILITY DIVERSIFICATION

As the potential benefits of diversification have become more
attractive to financially-strapped utility companies, the number of
utilities choosing to diversify has increased proportionately. 47 Because the activities of these utility companies, at least in their nondiversified forms, historically have fallen within the jurisdiction of
the commissions charged with their regulation, these commissions
have had to respond, by necessity, to the diversification strategies
being attempted by the utility companies they regulate. Whether
the commissions examining the activities of the products of these
diversification attempts have jurisdiction over them has been the
subject of debate in many states. The following case studies
represent a broad range of utility commission responses, including
a denial of public utility commission jurisdiction, a limited interpretation of public utility laws, a refusal to allow diversification,
and an attempt to accommodate a utility's diversification.
Jurisdictionof Michigan Public Service Commission
Over Divestitureof Michigan ConsolidatedGas Company
Michigan recently addressed the issue of public utility diversification in American Natural Resources Co. v. Michigan Public
Service Commission.48 In this case, a state circuit court found that
the Michigan Public Service Commission ("Commission") lacked jurisdiction to review the American Natural Resource Company's
("American Natural") divestiture of its utility subsidiary, 49 despite
charges that American Natural had stripped the utility of valuable assets prior to the divestiture.50

47. See supra notes 23-46 and accompanying text.
48. No. 81-27947-AA (Cir. Ct. of Ingham County, Mich. Oct. 26, 1981).
49. American National was a holding company for various energy-related corporations, one of which was Mich Con, a natural gas distribution utility company which also
maintained a profitable interstate storage division ("ISD"). See Complaint For Order of
Superintending Control at 1,2, Inquiry On the Commission's Own Motion, Into the Proposed Divestiture of Michigan Consolidated Gas Company by American Natural Resources Company, No. U-6790 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar. 5, 1981).
50. Staff Comments on Proposed Divestiture of Michigan Consolidated Gas Co. by
American Natural Resources Company at 31, 32, Inquiry, On the Commission's Own
Motion, Into the Proposed Divestiture of Michigan Consolidated Gas Company by American Natural Resources Co., No. U-6790 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar. 5, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Staff Comments].
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In the early months of 1981, the Commission learned that
American Natural was studying the feasibility of divesting itself
of one of its subsidiaries, the Michigan Consolidated Gas Company ("Mich Con"). 51 The Commission issued an order specifically

reserving jurisdiction over the divestiture 52 and directing Mich
Con to prepare testimony regarding the impact of the proposed
divestiture on rates and services.53 The Commission also directed
Mich Con to prepare testimony regarding certain transfers of
Mich Con assets to American Natural's subsidiaries 54 and to Amer5
ican Natural itself.

5

The Commission did not object to divestiture per se, but objected
to American Natural's pre-divestiture conduct. 56 While contemplating divestiture, Mich Con had entered into transactions with
American Natural and several of its subsidiaries involving the
transfer of Mich Con assets.57 These transfers of assets, the Commission charged, served to remove Mich Con's lucrative interstate
storage division from the Commission's jurisdiction 58 and deprived
Mich Con of the kind of assets necessary for future growth.5 9 None
of the transactions had been accomplished pursuant to Commis60
sion authorization.
Mich Con asserted that its divestiture and reorganization were
subject only to federal securities law, not to the Commission's
jurisdiction. 6 1 In addition, Mich Con maintained that its utility

51. Inquiry, On the Commission's Own Motion, Into the Proposed Divestiture of
Michigan Consolidated Gas Company by American Natural Resources Company, No.
U-6790 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar. 5, 1981) (Order and Notice of Hearing).
52. Id. at 4.
53. Id. at 3.
54. Id. at 3, 4.
55. Id. at 3.
56. Staff Comments, supra note 50, at 31.
57. Brief of Michigan Consolidated Gas Co. at 10, Inquiry, On the Commission's Own
Motion, Into the Proposed Divestiture of Michigan Consolidated Gas Company by American Natural Resources Company, No. U-6790 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar. 5, 1981)
[hereinafter cited to as Brief].
58. Staff Comments, supra note 50, at 19.
59. Id. at 31.
60. Id. at 24, 32. The parties disagreed as to whether the transactions required public
service commission authorization.
61. Mich Con asserted that American Natural's management was implementing
divestiture on behalf of its shareholders so that the only requirements applicable were
those set by the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Internal
Revenue Service rulings on the tax consequences of spin-offs and reorganizations. Brief,
supra note 57, at 4.
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services would not be impaired by reorganization 62 and that the
denounced transactions were matters strictly within American
Natural's business judgment, and thus did not warrant Commis63
sion involvement.
American Natural, Mich Con, and other involved subsidiaries
filed suit in circuit court to contest the exercise of Commission
jurisdiction. 64 The circuit court found that the Commission lacked
statutory jurisdiction over the proposed divestiture. 65 The Commission's subsequent appeal, however, was never adjudicated because all parties entered into a settlement agreement, which the
Commission approved. 66 American Natural agreed to divest Mich
Con by transferring its common stock to a newly-formed holding
company and distributing the holding company's stock to American Natural shareholders. 67 This transaction effectively divested
American Natural of the utility. The agreement also provided that
American Natural and Mich Con would restructure certain Mich
Con pre-divestiture transactions in a manner more favorable to
68
Mich Con.
In its order approving the settlement agreement, the Commission observed that the agreement implicitly recognized Commission jurisdiction over the securities and property issues involved
in the case. 69 Accordingly, the Commission specifically found
jurisdiction, 70 and ordered all parties to supply continuing documentation regarding the conduct and performance of the divest71
iture.
Because the circuit court held that the Michigan Public Service

62. Id. at 4, 5.
63. Id. at 5.
64. American Natural Resources Co. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, No. 81-27947AA (Cir. Ct. Ingham County, Mich. Sept. 8, 1981).
65. Final Order of Superintending Control And Permanent Injunction at 2, No. 8127947-AA (Cir. Ct. Ingham County, Mich. entered Oct. 26, 1981).
66. Order Approving Divestiture Pursuant to Settlement Agreement, In the Matter of
Inquiry, On the Commissioner's Own Motion, Into the Proposed Divestiture of Michigan
Consolidated Gas Co. by American Natural Resources Co., No. U-6954 (Mich. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n entered Dec. 1, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Order].

67. Settlement Agreement, at 2, Order Approving Divestiture Pursuant to Settlement Agreement of Michigan Consolidated Gas Co. by American Natural Resources Co., No. U-6954
(Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Dec. 1, 1981) (agreement entered into by all parties to action)
[hereinafter cited as Settlement Agreement].
68. Id. at 5.
69. Order, supra note 66, at 7. The Settlement Agreement was made subject to Commission approval. Settlement Agreement, supra note 67, at 6.
70. Id. at 8.
71. Id. at 9.
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Commission lacked jurisdiction in this case, the Commission
dealt with the Mich Con divestiture only after it was an accomplished fact. Adequate statutory jurisdiction would have helped
to prevent the holding company's wrongful transfer of Mich Con
assets and might have afforded more effective ratepayer protection.
Jurisdictionof Illinois Commerce Commission over
Reorganizationof Peoples Energy Corporation
Peoples Energy Corp. v. Illinois Commerce Commission 2 illustrates the difficulty of attempting to exercise public service commission jurisdiction over utilities solely through the use of "affiliated interest" statutes. 73 In this case, the Illinois Commerce Commission, like the Michigan Public Service Commission, found itself
without the power to assert regulatory oversight over a holding
company's divestiture of its utility operations.
On January 16, 1981, Peoples Energy Corporation ("PEC")
announced its investigation into the advantages that might result
from reorganizing its operations. 7 4 At the time, PEC was an Illinois holding company for eight subsidiaries in the energy industry.7 5 Only three of the eight subsidiaries were regulated entities
subject to administrative jurisdiction: 76 Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America ("Natural"), a natural gas company under the

72. No. 81 CH 6768, (Cir. Ct. of Cook County, Ill. Nov. 19, 1982).
73. See supra note 35.
74. Peoples Energy Corp. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, No. 81 CH 6768, slip op. at 25
(Cir. Ct. of Cook County, Ill. Nov. 19, 1982).
75. Id. at 6-8, 11-12. The subsidiaries were Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., North Shore
Gas Co., and Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. (regulated); Harper Oil Co., Texoma Production Co., Buckhorn Petroleum Co., Industrial Fuels Corp., and Exerter Co. (unregulated).
76. ILU REV. STAT. ch. 111-2/3 § 8 (1981). Section 8 of the Public Utilities Act provides
for administrative jurisdiction:
The Commission shall have general supervision of all public utilities, except as
otherwise provided in this Act, shall inquire into the management of the business thereof and shall keep itself informed as to the manner and method in
which the business is conducted... If any public utility is engaged in carrying
on any business other than that of a public utility, which other business is not
otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the commission, that public utility in
respect of such other business shall be subject to inquiry, examination and
inspection by the commission in the same manner as the public utility business
in so far as such inquiry, examination and inspection may be necessary to
enforce any provision of this Act...
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jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission; 77 Peoples Gas Light & Coke Company ("Peoples Gas"), regulated by the
Illinois Commerce Commission under the Illinois Public Utilities
Act, and North Shore Gas ("North Shore"); also regulated by the
Illinois Commerce Commission.78 PEC's plan was to spin-off 79 two
of its utility subsidiaries, Peoples Gas and North Shore, by separating the remaining subsidiaries from PEC and placing them
under a new parent, MidCon Corp. ("MidCon").80 The proposed
reorganization was for the avowed purpose of eliminating the regulatory jurisdiction of the Illinois Commerce Commission over
PEC's non-utility operations. 8 '
Upon learning of PEC's divestiture plans, the Illinois Commerce
Commission issued an order directing PEC, its present subsidiaries and other affiliated interests to show why the proposed divestiture would not be subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission,
and to the extent such a showing could not be made, to demonstrate that divestiture would be in the public interest.8 2 The Commission asserted its jurisdiction under Section 8 of the Illinois Public Utilities Act, which confers upon the Commission general
supervision over public utilities8 3 as well as under Section 8a's

77. See Federal Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717a-z (1982). Natural is subject to Illinois Commerce Commission jurisdiction only to the extent the Federal Natural Gas Act
does not pre-empt state legislation. The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution provides that state laws that are inconsistent with or frustrate the operation of federal law are subject to pre-emption by federal law. U.S. CONST. art. VI. "[W]here the United States exercises its power of legislation so as to conflict with a regulation of the state,
either specifically or by implication, the state legislation becomes inoperative and the
federal legislation exclusive in its application. Cloverleaf Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148,
156 (1942).
78. See supra note 76.
79. In this context, a spin-off is a corporation's distribution to its own shareholders
stock in another corporation. R. HOLZMAN, CORPORATE REORGANIZATION 8.21-.24 (1955).
80. PEC had earlier created MidCon as a subsidiary holding company over the nonutility ventures. Peoples Energy Corp. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, No. 81 CH 6768,
slip op. at 18, 21 (Cir. Ct. of Cook County, Ill. Nov. 19, 1982).
81. Id. at 23. The Illinois Commerce Commission's jurisdiction over the utilities
created a kind of "shadow jurisdiction" over the non-utilities which could not be eliminated without a change in PEC's corporate structure. The separation of the non-utility
ventures from the utilities left the non-utilities beyond the reach of Illinois Commerce
Commission jurisdiction.
82. Peoples Energy Corp., No. 81-0509, slip op. at 4 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n July 22,
1981).
83. See supra note 76.
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"affiliated interests" provision, which gives the Commission
regulatory jurisdiction over persons and corporations affiliated
8 4
with a public utility.
PEC responded by filing suit in the Circuit Court of Cook
County for declaratory and injunctive relief.85 PEC asked the
court to find that the Illinois Public Utilities Act did not give the
Commission jurisdiction over PEC or its reorganization,8 6 because
neither PEC, Natural, nor MidCon were public utilities as defined
under the Act. PEC claimed that since the utilities involved, Peoples Gas and North Shore, were not named parties to the transaction between the holding companies, MidCon and PEC, the
87
Act's "affiliated interests" jurisdiction was inapplicable.
PEC's case attracted the interest of numerous industry observers, five of whom intervened in the proceedings.8 8 The intervenors agreed with the Commission that despite the form of PEC's
reorganization the substance was a transaction intended to be
within the jurisdiction of the Illinois Commerce Commission.8 9
The intervenors asserted that under the proposed reorganization
PEC would be a public utility under Section 10.3 of the Public
Utilities Act 90 because of PEC's indirect ownership of Peoples

84. The "affiliated interest" provision, § 8a(2), provides:
The Commission shall have jurisdiction over affiliated interests having transactions, other than ownership of stock and receipt of dividends thereon, with
public utilities under the jurisdiction of the Commission ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-2/3 § 8a(2) (1981).
85. Peoples Energy Corp. v. Illinois Commerce Comm's, No. 81 CH 6768, slip op. at 5
(Cir. Ct. of Cook County, Ill. Nov. 19, 1982).
86. Id.
87. Plaintiffs Brief In Support Of Complaint For Injunctive And Declaratory Relief
at 28, Peoples Energy Corp. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, No. 81 CH 6768, (Cir. Ct. Cook
County, Ill. Nov. 19, 1982).
88. The intervenors were the South Austin Coalition Community Council, Inc., Business and Professional People for the Public Interest, People of Cook County ex rel.
Richard M. Daley, State's Attorney of Cook County, City of Chicago, Governor's Office of
Consumer Services, People of the State of Illinois.
89. Peoples Energy Corp. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, No. 81 CH 6768, slip op. at
6-9 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill. Nov. 19, 1982).
90. The pertinent provision of the Act defines a public utility as:
[Elvery corporation, company, association, joint stock company or association,
firm, partnership or individual, their lessees, trustees, or receivers appointed
by any court whatsoever that owns, controls, operates or manages, within this
State, directly or indirectly, for public use, any plant, equipment or property
used or to be used for or in connection with, or owns or controls any franchise,
license, permit or right to engage in ... the production, storage, transmission,
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Gas and North Shore and thus should remain subject to the
Commission's jurisdiction. 91 Additionally, the intervenors argued
that the proposed reorganization, if permitted, might result in
less reliable service, increased natural gas utility rates, 92 and a
possible loss of certain financial and physical assets which
Peoples Gas and North Shore allegedly included in their rate
93
bases.
Nonetheless, the Circuit Court held that under these circumstances the Illinois Commerce Commission could not assert
jurisdiction over PEC or PEC's reorganization. 94 The court observed that holding companies of Illinois public utilities had
never been treated by the Illinois Commerce Commission as public utilities. 95 The court found that although PEC had historically been treated as an "affiliated interest," 96 the corporate
reorganization was not a transaction with a public utility.9 7 Therefore, the Illinois Commerce Commission lacked jurisdiction under
the "affiliated interest" statutory provision.98 PEC's avowed purpose of avoiding Commission jurisdiction, the court implied, was
wholly irrelevant. 99 The PEC divestiture took place on November

sale, delivery or furnishing of heat, cold, light, power, electricity or water...
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-2/3 § 10.3(c) (1981).
91. Peoples Energy Corp. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, No. 81 CH 6768, slip op. at
6-9, (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill. Nov. 19, 1982).
92. Id. The intervenors feared that utility assets might be transferred to non-utility
ventures, resulting in a reduction of the utility's rate base and possibly an increase in
rates.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. The court held the fact that a particular company controls a public utility an
insufficient basis to establish the Commission's jurisdiction over that company. The
court based its reasoning on past ICC interpretation of the Illinois Public Utilities Act:
the ICC historically had treated the PEC as an affiliated interest although the ICC was
aware of indicia of PEC's control over its utility subsidiaries, including PEC's ownership
of the stock of Peoples Gas Light, North Shore, and Natural; when NICOR was established as a holding company over the Northern Illinois Gas Company, the Commission
held that NICOR was not a public utility; AT&T was not treated as a public utility by the
ICC despite that holding company's stock ownership in Illinois Bell; and over the past 14
years, the ICC consistently declined to treat holding companies of public utilities as public utilities. Id. at 95.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 90.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 91.
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30, 1981. The intervenors are presently appealing the circuit
court decision. 10 0
This case illustrates the problems with attempting to exercise
commission jurisdiction solely through the use of "affiliated
interests" statutes. Although the purpose of affiliated interests
statutes is to permit public service commissions to regulate key
utility transactions, commissions can nonetheless find themselves
in the position of lacking the statutory authority to exercise
jurisdiction over the most material transaction of all, the divestiture of a utility. Although public utility law in Illinois currently
provides for public service commission jurisdiction over certain
transactions in which a utility is directly involved, the commission still lacks the statutory flexibility to involve itself in transactions having direct repercussions on utilities even when those
transactions fall within the spirit of Illinois public utility law.
Jurisdictionof New York Public Service Commission
Over ProposedReorganizationof Rochester
Telephone Corporation
In Joint Petition of Rochester Telephone Corp., Rotelcom, Inc.
and Rotelcom Subsidiary, Inc.,1°1 the New York Public Service
Commission refused topermit a utility to form a holding company
for the purpose of diversification.10 2 On April 8, 1976, the Rochester Telephone Corporation ("Rochester Telephone"), Rotelcom, Inc.
and Rotelcom Subsidiary, Inc. ("petitioners") filed a petition with
the New York Public Service Commission ("Commission"), seeking authorization for reorganization. 10 3 Rotelcom, Inc. was organized for the express purpose of serving as a holding company after
reorganization, while Rotelcom Subsidiary, Inc. was organized to

100. Id.
101. Opinion & Order Denying Petition for Authority to Effect Corporate Reorganizing Joint Petition of Rochester Telephone Corp., Rotelcom, Inc. & Rotelcom Subsidiary,
Inc. for Authority to Effect a Merger of Rotelcom Subsidiary, Inc. into Rochester Telephone Corporation, No. 78-5 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar. 27, 1978) [hereinafter cited as
March Opinion].
102. The New York commission was apparently motivated by the desire to avoid the
situation experienced in Michigan and Illinois, that is, the inability of public service
commissions to exercise jurisdiction over a utility because it is held by a holding
company.
103. March Opinion, supra note 101, at 1. Rochester Telephone was a public utility
providing telecommunication services to the Rochester area.
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facilitate the proposed reorganization.1 0 4 Petitioners claimed that
Rochester Telephone was suffering capital stagnation under the
existing corporate structure 10 5 and that Rochester Telephone's
financing capabilities would be enhanced if petitioners were
permitted to organize an unregulated, diversified holding company.1 0 6 Under the plan, Rochester Telephone would become a
07
subsidiary of Rotelcom, the holding company.'
The Commission denied the petition,'0 8 primarily because the
Commission felt that the petitioners could achieve their financial
goals without forming a holding company.'0 9 The Commission
feared that an unregulated holding company might use Rochester Telephone's capital in pursuit of diversified interests to the
detriment of ratepayers."10 Approval of the petition, the Commission noted, could well benefit shareholders if successful, but
both ratepayers and shareholders would bear the risk of failure.11 1 The Commission also predicted that the holding company
might become a takeover target."12 The Commission concluded
that the creation of a diversified holding company outside the
Commission's jurisdiction would "profoundly impair" the Commission's ability to regulate Rochester Telephone according to
the Commission's statutory mandate.' ' 3 The Commission stated

104. Id. at 1 n.1, Technically, the petition was a request for permission to merge the
Rotelcom Subsidiary with Rochester Telephone Corporation. After the merger, the Rotelcorn Subsidiary would be dissolved, leaving Rochester Telephone a subsidiary of Rotelcom, Inc., the proposed holding company. The reorganization was structured in this
manner for tax purposes.
105. Id. at 4. Petitioners did not deny that their operations were financially successful,
but argued that they had reached a "zenith" from which they would fall if not permitted
to expand. The Commission said it would not respond since petitioners could show
neither signs of business stagnation nor indicia of "supposedly imminent financial deterioration." Id. at 6.
106. Id. at 8.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 15.
109. Id. at 4.
110. Id. at 11. The Commission expressed concern that if a holding company were
authorized, the respective interests of Rochester and its holding company might differ.
The Commission said that Rochester would be obligated to re-evaluate its commitment to
reliable service at reliable rates, and that the Commission would be unable to intervene
directly because of lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 4.
111. Id.at3.
112. Id.
113. The Commission reasoned that its ability to regulate Rochester Telephone would
be seriously impaired because the holding company's diversification strategy would to
some extent influence the cost of capital to the utility. Accordingly, utility rates would
become indirectly dependent on managerial discretion. Id. at 10, 11.
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that although it would not approve the proposed holding company arrangement, it would not object to another form of utility
diversification.' 1 4 Petitioners responded that were they to forego
the proposed holding company, the Commission would nevertheless lack jurisdiction to allow other methods of diversification.1 5 The Commission did not decide that jurisdictional question,1 6 but concluded by noting that it would welcome a petition
from Rochester Telephone seeking authority to pursue in other
ways the goals outlined as the basis for forming the proposed
17
holding company.'
The New York Public Service Commission's response to
Rochester Telephone's application to form a holding company
does not represent the best approach to the question because it is
too restrictive. With appropriate safeguards, holding companies
serve as useful and reasonable corporate structures for conducting a diversified utility business. The Commission's refusal to
allow the arrangement limits corporate growth because utilities
and utility ratepayers could be protected from holding company
abuses by adequate commission oversight. The mere fact that a
utility organizes a holding company does not signal that abuse
will inevitably result, but public service commissions should
have the statutory authority to exercise jurisdiction when holding companies do disserve ratepayers.
Jurisdictionof ConnecticutPublic Utilities Control
Authority Over Reorganization of Southern Connecticut
Gas Company
The State of Connecticut also recently considered the diversification of a public utility holding company in Application of the

114. The Commission stated that it was "clearly" willing to allow Rochester to diversify. The objection was to the proposed holding company, which would result in diversification that might not meet the "public interest" standard called for in administrative
proceedings. Id. at 14. In contrast, under Rochester's present corporate structure, the public service commission had jurisdiction over the scope and direction of the utility's diversification. Id. at 5 n.1.
115. Id. at 13. Petitioners argued that the provisions of the Public Service Law forbade
"telephone corporations" from engaging in activities other than the operation of telephones. Therefore, if the commission would not allow petitioners to form a holding company and diversify under that structure, petitioners would remain a telephone corporation without the legal authority to diversify. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 15.
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Southern Connecticut Gas Co. 118 The Connecticut Public Utilities Control Authority's resolution of the public utility holding
company issue is perhaps the most equitable of the four cases
studied. In this case, the court permitted the utility to form a
holding company, but this permission was conditioned on implementation of a number of safeguards. 19
Unlike Illinois, the Connecticut Commission had statutory jurisdiction to place conditions on the formation of the holding company. 120 It is still uncertain, however, whether the conditions the
Commission imposed upon the formation of the holding company
in the instant case will apply to future holding companies.
On August 30, 1977, the Southern Connecticut Gas Company
("Southern") filed an application for corporate reorganization
121
with the Connecticut Public Utilities Control Authority ("PUCA").
Southern asked for authorization to change its corporate structure from a gas utility with subsidiaries to a holding company
with utility and non-utility subsidiaries. 122 At the time the application was filed, Southern was a gas distribution company with
six subsidiaries. 23 Two of the subsidiaries, SCG Gas Quest, Inc.
and Resource Production, Inc., were organized for the purpose of
drilling and exploring for oil and natural gas.1 24 These subsid-

118. Application of the Southern Connecticut Gas Company for Approval of Corporate Reorganization and Merger and Formation of a Holding Company, No. 770828
(Conn. Pub. Utilities Control Auth. Dec. 13, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Connecticut
Decision].
119. Id. at 29-34.
120. A Connecticut statute provides that a holding company may not be formed over
a utility without public service commission approval. The statute provides in relevant
part:
(b) No gas, electric, water, or community antenna television company, or holding company ...shall interfere or attempt to interfere with or, directly or indirectly, exercise or attempt to exercise authority or control over any gas, electric,
water or community antenna television company incorporated by this state ...
without first obtaining the approval of.the department of public utility control ....
(c) No corporation ...or similar organization, or person shall take any action
that causes it to become a holding company with control over a gas, electric,
water or community antenna television company incorporated by this state ...
or take any action that would if successful cause it to become or to acquire
control over such a holding company, without first obtaining the approval of
the department.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-47 (West 1982).
121. Connecticut Decision, supra note 118, at 1.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 17.
124. The remaining subsidiaries include ECON, Inc. (general contractor and building
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iaries had discovered millions of dollars worth of oil and gas
reserves in Ohio and New York.' 25 Southern initially justified
these ventures to PUCA by arguing the necessity of maintaining
some measure of control over its supply of gas, since its major
pipeline suppliers had indicated uncertainty as to their ability to
provide Southern with adequate supplies in the future.' 26 At the
same time, Southern argued that the pre-reorganization corporate structure of the company exposed ratepayers to possible
127
"detrimental effects" should any of the non-utilities fail.
Organization of a holding company for Southern and its subsidiaries as sisters would purportedly benefit ratepayers by shielding them from the risk of non-utilities' failures. 128 In addition,
the new corporate structure would allow the exploration and
production subsidiaries to escape the restrictions of Southern's
Certificate of Incorporation, 129 and would assure gas supplies at
reasonable costs. 130 Moreover, Southern argued that diversification would enable these subsidiaries to enjoy a more favorable
131
reception in the financial community.

improvement services company); Onset Marketing, Inc. (advertising and communication
services); Gas* Storage, Inc. (created to co-ordinate ownership of out-of-state gas storage
facilities); and SCG Pipeline, Inc. (created to transport any company gas discoveries from
wells to interstate pipelines). Id. at 18, 25.
125. Brief of the Office of Consumer Counsel In Opposition to Approval of the Company's Application at 2, Application of the Southern Connecticut Gas Company for
Approval of Corporate Reorganization And Merger And Formation Of A Holding Company, No. 770828 (Conn. Pub. Utilities Control Auth. Dec. 13, 1978) [hereinafter cited as
Consumer Counsel Brief].
126. Memorandum on Behalf of the Southern Connecticut Gas Co. In Support of Its
Application at 3, Application of the Southern Connecticut Gas Company for Approval of
Corporate Reorganization And Merger And Formation of A Holding Company, No.
770828 (Conn. Pub. Utilities Control Auth. Dec. 13, 1978).
127. Id. at 6.
128. Southern reasoned that ratepayers would be better protected under the holding
company arrangement because the failure of the non-utility venture would have little or
no impact on a separate utility subsidiary. If the non-utility venture was a Southern
subsidiary, however, and that venture failed, ratepayers might bear at least part of the
loss in the form of higher rates. Id. at 7. Southern apparently assumed that the possible
failure of the holding company's non-utilities would have no impact on the utility
subsidiary.
129. Southern argued that since Southern's bond indenture prohibited its subsidiaries

from borrowing from any source other than Southern and because Southern's bond
indenture and certificate of incorporation in turn limited Southern's own borrowing,
Southern's drilling and exploration subsidiaries were prevented from securing the funds
necessary to achieve their purpose of providing Connecticut ratepayers with an adequate
and reasonably priced natural gas supply. Id. at 6.
130. Id. at 12.
131. Southern reasoned that one economic benefit to shareholders would be the distrib-
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In the PUCA hearing regarding Southern's application, Connecticut's Office of Consumer Counsel ("Consumer Counsel")
intervened to maintain that Southern's application should be
granted only if the granting order were subject to the Consumer
Counsel's thirty-five conditions. 132 These conditions were designed to protect ratepayers and to preserve much of PUCA's
regulatory jurisdiction. 33 The Consumer Counsel contended that
the true purpose of Southern's proposed reorganization was to
isolate profits accruing from unregulated oil and gas discoveries
and to funnel them to Southern shareholders, who would become
shareholders of the parent company under the proposed reorganization. 34 Southern ratepayers funded the original exploration,
the Consumer Counsel said, and therefore should share in the
profits. 35 The Consumer Counsel also argued that the holding
company structure would not protect ratepayers from financial
risk, since the financial health of a subsidiary is related to the
financial health of the parent. 3 6 If the non-utility subsidiaries
failed, the result could be an increase in utility rates. The Consumer Counsel also observed that while one of Southern's purposes in expanding oil and gas production efforts was to assure
Connecticut ratepayers an adequate gas supply, it was not clear
whether federal law would permit Southern to bring gas found
out of state back to Connecticut, 37 rendering this goal inapplicable.
The Consumer Counsel maintained that PUCA should address
the fact that Southern, prior to applying for permission to form a
holding company, had created its subsidiaries without PUCA's
authorization.' 38 Southern's subsidiaries should remain subject

ution to shareholders of retained earnings that had been formerly used for subsidiary
investment purposes. Id. at 9-16.
132. Consumer Counsel Brief, supra note 125, at 6.
133. Aside from the twenty-one conditions PUCA eventually adopted in this case, the
Office of the Consumer Counsel proposed 35 conditions, including that no new parent
companies, subsidiaries or affiliated corporations be organized in the existing holding
company structure without prior PUCA approval; profits from any discoveries made
before the incorporation of the holding company be shared equally with Southern's ratepayers; a system be developed for the equitable allocation of common costs; and the holding company at all times own 100% of its subsidiaries. Id. at 48-54.
134. Id. at 9.
135. Id. at 5.
136. Id. at 35.
137. Id. at 17.
138. Id. at 7.
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to PUCA jurisdiction, the Consumer Counsel argued, 139 and
Southern should not be allowed to organize new subsidiaries
without PUCA approval. 14 0 Finally, the Consumer Counsel proposed that should PUCA authorize the holding company arrangement, PUCA should retain the right to inspect all books and
records of the holding company, subsidiaries and any affiliated
companies.1 4 1 This would enable PUCA to discover any attempt
by Southern to cross-subsidize, construct improper financing, or
1 42
wrongfully transfer utility assets.
PUCA granted Southern's application to form a holding company, stipulating that it would analyze Southern's rate hike
applications without considering the financial fortune or misfortune of Southern's sister subsidiaries.1 43 PUCA made its decision subject to a number of conditions. First, Southern was to be
given first opportunity to purchase any gas found by a sister subsidiary.1 44 Second, non-utility subsidiaries were not to be organized unless functionally related to Southern.1 45 Third, the holding company had to be incorporated in the state of Connecticut.146 Fourth, the books and records of the holding company
and its subsidiaries were subject to PUCA inspection.1 47 Finally,
PUCA conditioned its decision on Southern's agreement to subject holding company operations to PUCA review. If PUCA
decided that the continued operation of the holding company
was not in ratepayers' best interests, PUCA could amend operating conditions or even dissolve the holding company.1 48
PUCA's treatment of Southern's diversification is an equitable
resolution of the competing parties' interests. In granting Southern's application, PUCA apparently believed that any disadvantages in the holding company arrangement were outweighed by

139. Id. at 8.
140. Id. at 48. PUCA's review of the organization of new subsidiaries would ensure
that subsidiaries are not improperly financed and that utility assets are not transferred.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 53.
143. Connecticut Decision, supra note 118, at 32.
144. Id. at 29.
145. Id. at 32.
146. PUCA stipulated that the holding company be incorporated in Connecticut, thus
becoming subject to the Connecticut statute CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-47 (West 1960 &
Supp. 1982), which provides for administrative review of utility holding company activity. Connecticut Decision, supra note 118, at 32.
147. Id. at 31.
148. Id. at 33.
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the advantages ratepayers would enjoy, and that continued
monitoring would protect the interests of Southern's ratepayers
against possible abuses. PUCA's assent to the proposal helps to
ensure that Southern's ratepayers can rely on the utility's ability
to secure adequate gas supplies. In addition, implementation of a
diversification strategy enables Southern to attempt to build a
broader financial base. At the same time, PUCA's imposition of
conditions protects ratepayers. PUCA's dictate that any nonutility subsidiaries organized must be functionally related ensures that the utility builds on its expertise instead of engaging
in unfamiliar and risky endeavors. While the requirement that
the holding company be organized in Connecticut operates to
protect against evasion of state control, the condition that books
and records shall be open to Commission inspection protects
against cross-subsidization and improper financing. Finally,
PUCA provides for Commission flexibility by reserving the right
to amend operating conditions if necessary. The primary inadequacy of PUCA's response is the uncertainty that the protective
conditions ordered by PUCA will apply to future utility diversifications absent public interest group pressure.
FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER INTERSTATE PUBLIC UTILITY
HOLDING COMPANY DIVERSIFICATION
Many public utility holding companies are subject to federal as
well as state regulation. Public utility holding companies with
interstate operations are subject to Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") jurisdiction under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 ("PUHCA"). 1 49 States may want to
consider the PUHCA approach as an alternative model in evaluating their own commissions' jurisdictional reaches.
149. The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 ("PUHCA") defines a holding
company as
(A) any company which directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with
power to vote, 10 per centum or more of the outstanding voting securities of a
public-utility company....
(B) any person which the Commission determines, after notice and opportunity
for hearing, directly or indirectly to exercise ... such a controlling influence
over the management or policies of any public-utility or holding company as to
make it necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors or consumers that such person be subject to the obligations . . .
imposed in this chapter....
15 U.S.C. § 79b(7) (1982).
The Securities & Exchange Commission is charged with the enforcement of PUHCA
because the Act is geared towards protecting the interests of investors of holding com-
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PUHCA was enacted to counter utility holding company abuses, 150
including fraudulent accounting practices, manipulation of the
security markets, intercompany financing agreements disadvantageous to utilities, and pyramiding practices.1 5 1 The act provides for the elimination of unwieldy and practically ungovernable holding companies by giving the SEC authority to order
utility holding companies to simplify their operations by reorganization. 152 PUCHA was designed primarily to assure the integrity of public utility holding companies,1 53 not to sound the

panies and ensuring that investors have access to adequate and accurate holding company investment information. 15 U.S.C. § 79a (1982). The Act requires holding companies or entities intending to become holding companies to register under the Act with the
Securities & Exchange Commission. 15 U.S.C. § 79e(a)(1) (1982).
150. The Federal Trade Commission's study of public utility holding companies ultimately resulted in the production of over eighty volumes published by Congress as S.
Doc. No. 92, 70th Cong. 1st Sess. (1928). For an analysis of the public utility holding
company problem, see Buchanan, The Public Utility Holding Company Problem, 25
CALIF. L. REV. 517 (1937); Comment, FederalRegulation of Holding Companies: The Public Utility Act of 1935, 45 YALE L.J. 468 (1936).
151. In pyramid schemes, investors in a business profit by persuading other investors
to invest in the business. Each new investor finds that the only way to earn a sizable
profit in the pyramid is by persuading still others to join the company. Product sales
become secondary. See SECURITIES, EXEMPTED SECURITIES, AND SOME KEY DEFINITIONS, 3
SEC. & FED. CORP. L. REP. (CLARK BOARDMAN) § 2.13(2) (1979).

Pyramiding in the context of holding companies generally involves the insertion of a
number of holding companies between the controlling interest and the operating properties. The construction of this type of corporate structure converts a normally sound
investment into a highly speculative enterprise. C. WILCOX, PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD
BUSINESS 364-65 (3rd ed. 1966). The enterprise becomes speculative because an economic
setback to any of the corporations in the pyramid can severely impair the entire pyramid's profitability.
152. 15 U.S.C. § 79k (1982). See Phillips v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 185 F.2d 746
(D.C. Cir. 1950) (holding company's management bears primary responsibility for framing and adopting reorganization plans); Protective Comm. v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n,
184 F.2d 646, 648, 649 (2d Cir. 1950) (SEC order dissolving holding company upheld, due
to SEC's findings that the operating subsidiaries unduly and unnecessarily complicated
corporate structure, and that holding company contributed nothing to benefit operating
companies); In re LaClede Gas Light Co., 57 F. Supp. 997, 1003 (E.D. Mo. 1944) (SEC
authority to order holding company to divest interest in public utility company upheld
because of SEC's belief that utility should be recapitalized for purpose of fairly and equitably distributing voting power among shareholders); In re Community Power & Light
Co., 33 F. Supp. 901, 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (corporate structure unnecessarily complicated'
when corporations involved are prevented from performing their functions; corporation
had not declared dividends in previous nine years due to debt obligations and other
financial problems).
Under PUHCA, the SEC also exercises jurisdiction over holding company transactions
such as stock issuances (§ 79f, g); acquisition of interest in electric and gas companies
(§ 79h); acquisition of interests in non-utilities (§ 79i, j); intercompany transactions
(§ 791); and service, sales, and construction contracts (§ 79m).
153. See In re United Corp., 232 F.2d 601, 604 (3d Cir.), (purpose of PUHCA to elimin-
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"death knell" for these companies.154
Under the statute, all public utility holding companies must
register with the SEC 155 unless they fall within PUHCA's liberal
exemption provisions. 156 A registered utility holding company
wishing to diversify must first meet the "functionally-related"
test set out in section 79k(b)(1) of PUHCA.157 Under this test, a

ate evils associated with public utility holding companies), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 839
(1956); American Natural Gas Co. v. United States, 279 F.2d 220 (Ct. Cl.), (purpose of
PUHCA to protect public from abuses inherent in public utility holding companies), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 900 (1960).
154. See, e.g., United Gas Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 248 F. Supp. 449, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
The court noted that the act neither proscribes holding companies nor makes them illegal. Rather, the act regulates holding company operation and vests the SEC with
enforcement authority.
155. 15 U.S.C. § 79e. See In re United Corp., 232 F.2d 601, 604 (3d Cir.) (holding company registered under the Act is subject to SEC jurisdiction), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 839
(1956) ; Nichols v. Alker, 231 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), (primary jurisdiction of SEC under
PUHCA is exclusive), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956); United Gas Improvement Co. v.
Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 138 F.2d 1010, 1019 (3d Cir. 1943) (Congress intended that
SEC examine interests of every registered holding company). See also Morgan Stanley &
Co. v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 126 F.2d 325 (2d Cir. 1942) (ambiguity in Act to be
interpreted by SEC in accord with broad purpose of PUHCA).
156. Notably, the Act provides for the exemption of holding companies which are
predominantly intrastate in character, 15 U.S.C. § 79c(a)(1)15 U.S.C. § 79c(a)(1) (1982),
holding companies operating predominantly as intrastate public utilities, 15 U.S.C.
§ 79c(a)(2), holding companies whose subsidiaries are predominantly nonutilities, 15
U.S.C. § 79c(a)(3), holding companies acting only temporarily as holding companies for
reasons of debt settlement or securities underwriting or distribution, 15 U.S.C. § 79c(4),
and holding companies which do not derive their income primarily from public utilities
located in the United States, 15 U.S.C. § 79c(a)(5). The SEC can also exempt from registration the subsidiary of a holding company if the Commission finds that the subsidiary
is not a public utility and derives no material part of its income from sources within the
United States, 15 U.S.C. § 79c(b) (1982).
The strictures for non-exempt holding companies include requirements for filing detailed
information regarding the holding company's operation. Holding companies must file
registration statements with the SEC. The registration statement includes information
regarding the financial structure of the business, terms and classes of securities, directors
and officers, contracts not made in the ordinary course of business, profit and loss statements and other information which the SEC deems necessary to the public interest. 15
U.S.C. § 79e (1982).
PUHCA also limits the issuance of securities, 15 U.S.C. § 79f (1982), the acquisition of
additional electric and gas utilities, 15 U.S.C. § 79h (1982), intercompany loans, 15 U.S.C.
§ 79i (1982), and service, sales, and construction contracts with holding company subsidiaries. 15 U.S.C. § 79m (1982). Additionally, the SEC has the authority to order reports
from holding companies, 15 U.S.C. § 79n (1982), and to dictate the kind and form of
records required. 15 U.S.C. § 79o (1982). Finally, PUHCA gives the SEC the authority to
amend PUHCA as necessary to implement the purposes of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 79t
(1982).
157. After notice and an opportunity for a hearing, the SEC can order registered hold-
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utility holding company may not diversify unless the proposed
operation is "reasonably incidental, or economically necessary or
appropriate to the operations of such integrated public utility
system."1 5 8 A review of both SEC and judicial decisions reveals
that applications to diversify into other energy-related enterprises will likely be granted, 15 9 while applications to diversify
160 land development, 16 1
into non-utility operations, like housing,
and other non-utility businesses 162 will likely be denied. The
Act's bias thus appears to be in favor of maintaining integrated
holding company systems as well as providing for broad and
16 3
flexible SEC authority.
The PUHCA Approach
Although PUHCA can serve for states as one approach to regulating public utility holding companies, it is not an ideal model.
ing companies and their subsidiaries to "take such action as the Commission shall find
necessary to limit the operations of the holding-company system of which such company
is a part to a single integrated public-utility system, and to such other businesses as are
reasonably incidental, or economically necessary or appropriate to the operations of such
integrated public-utility system." 15 U.S.C. § 79k(b)(1) (1982).
158. Id.
159. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 170 F.2d 453
(8th Cir. 1948) (pipeline construction); In re Ohio Power Co., SEC Holding Company Act
Release No. 21,173 (August 3, 1979) (railcar repair facilities); In re Columbia Gas of Ohio,
Inc., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 20,561 (May 26, 1978) (insulation); In re
New England Electric System, SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 18,635 (Oct. 30,
1974) (oil and gas exploration); In re Middle South Utilities, Inc., SEC Holding Company
Act Release No. 18,554 (Sept. 5, 1974) (refineries); In re Columbia Gas of Pennsylvania,
Inc., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 16,457 (Aug. 20, 1969) (application to
acquire assets of non-associated gas company granted); In re Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 15,958 (Feb. 6, 1968) (application by
sponsoring electric companies to acquire common stock of nuclear generating company
granted); In re Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates, SEC Holding Company Act Release No.
15,887 (Nov. 3, 1967) (application to acquire common stock of nonassociate gas company
granted); In re American Electric Power Co., Inc., SEC Holding Company Act Release
No. 15,800 (July 24, 1967) (application to acquire common stock of non-affiliated gas and
electric company granted).
160. Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 444 F.2d 913 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (upheld SEC denial of holding company's application to acquire common stock and
short term notes to finance construction of housing projects); In re Mississippi Power &
Light Company, 86 Public Util. Rep. (PUR) 199 (SEC Release No. 16,814 Aug. 20, 1970)
(application to acquire securities to finance construction and operation of housing development denied).
161. North Am. Co., 11 S.E.C. 194 (1942) (application to diversify into land development denied).
162. Re Pennzoil Co., 72 Public Util. Rep. (PUR) 485 (SEC Release No. 15,963 Feb. 7,
1968) (portion of application seeking permission to acquire non-utility businesses denied).
163. See Comment, Non-Utility Acquisitions Under The Public Utility Holding Corn-
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First, although the public interest is the nominal basis for the
SEC's decisions, PUHCA's emphasis is on securities and the
protection of investors. 6 1 In contrast, ratepayer protection, not
shareholder protection, is the primary problem in public utility
holding company diversification. State legislation should reflect
this purpose.
Secondly, PUHCA's strict limitations on diversification ignore
the reality that many public utilities have engaged in stateapproved diversification and will continue to do so in even
greater numbers in the future. 165 The appropriate legislative
response would recognize the place for diversification in the utility business 66 and provide adequate ratepayer protection through
167
regulatory review.

pany Act, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 434 (1971).
164. See supra note 149.
165. See DiversificationFever, supra note 29, at 6 (citing an Edison Electric Institute
study). See generally CABOT CONSULTING GROUP, supra note 26.
166. For some utilities, failure to diversify might seriously impair that utility's financial health. One commentator has pointed out that Texaco's failure to react quickly and
constructively to the 1973 oil crisis almost resulted in disaster for that company. By comparison, six other major oil firms facing the same challenge quickly diversified, and did
not suffer Texaco's setback. Lewis & Ross, supra note 2, at 22.
167. The SEC's interest in regulating holding companies is not great. Of 107 public
utility holding companies registered with the SEC, 93 are exempt from SEC registration.
The SEC's enforcement of PUHCA has been criticized. In a 1977 study of the SEC's

enforcement of PUHCA, the Comptroller General of the United States concluded that
enforcement of the Act was inadequate because many holding companies are engaged in
nonutility ventures the Act was intended to prevent. In addition, the SEC lacks an affirmative program to determine whether holding companies' management are violating the
Act, and very few holding companies are monitored under the Act. The Comptroller General's report also noted that while in the 1940's 234 SEC staff members were charged
with enforcement of the Act, that number has now dwindled to less than 25.
According to the SEC, the staff reduction is justified because the Commission believes
the Act's goal of eliminating complex utility holding companies has largely been accomplished. Compare Comptroller General of the United States, Report to the Congress, The
Force of the Public Utility Holding Company Act Has Been Greatly Reduced by Changes
in the Securities and Exchange Commission's Enforcement Policies (June 20, 1977)
[hereinafter cited as Comptroller's Report], with Comment of the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the Comptroller General's Report of June 20, 1977, to the Congress on the
Administration of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (June 30, 1977)
reprinted in Comptroller's Report, id. [hereinafter cited as SEC Comment]. The SEC
responded that Congress never intended that utilities remain permanent "federal wards"
under the Act, and that "rigorous enforcement" of the Act over the years has resulted in
the elimination of most holding company abuses. SEC Comment, at 11. In a follow-up
report, the Comptroller General expressed doubts as to whether PUHCA's purpose has
indeed been achieved, and recommended that Congress direct the SEC to undertake a
fresh study of the gas and electric utility industry. Comptroller General of the United
States, Report to the Congress, The Securities and Exchange Commission's Regulation of
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It is especially important that states respond affirmatively
rather than allowing events to shape regulatory jurisdiction in
an ad hoc fashion since the provision in PUHCA exempting
intra-state holding companies from SEC review presumes that
states are exercising adequate regulatory jurisdiction.1 6 8 Furthermore, two bills recently introduced in Congress to amend
PUHCA would provide even broader exemptions for public utility holding companies, 16 9 which would shift an even greater
burden onto states to assure ratepayer protection. Nonetheless,
some PUHCA provisions, particularly the reporting and accounting provisions, could serve as models for states.
STATES' JURISDICTIONAL OPTIONS
States should provide an appropriate statutory response to
utility diversification in order to protect the public interest. Legislatures must recognize that public service commission jurisdiction should extend comprehensively over public utility holding companies and their non-utility subsidiaries. If state legislatures limit state administrative jurisdiction to affiliated interests statutes, holding companies' freedom to exercise independent business judgment will be greater, but public service commissions will not have sufficient access to information to ensure
that the public interest is not being disserved by the formation of
holding companies. 170 Nevertheless, a comprehensive grant of
public service commission jurisdiction extending over the public
utility holding company's non-utility operations must consider
the limited levels of funding, manpower and expertise available

Public Utility Holding Companies: An Evaluation of Commission Comments on a Critical Report 6 (January 4, 1978).
See generally Gregory & Strickland, Hugo Black's CongressionalInvestigationof Lobbying and the Public Utilities Holding Company Act: A Historical View of the Power
Trust, New Deal Politics, and Regulatory Propaganda,29 OKLA. L. REv. 543 (1976);
Hawes, Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935-Fossil or Foil?, 30 VAND. L. REV.
605 (1977); Leary, "Fairand Equitable" Distribution of Voting Power Under the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 52 MICH. L. REv. 71 (1953).
168. According to the SEC, one of the major purposes of the Act was to make possible
state jurisdiction over public utility holding companies by eliminating holding company
evasion through the Act's registration provision. SEC Comment, supra note 167, at 20.
169. H.R. 5220, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 1870, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). These
amendments would operate primarily to facilitate the diversification of public utility
holding companies subject to PUHCA.
170. See J. MALKO, G. ENHOLM & T. JADITZ, supra note 1, at 46.

19831

Public Utility Diversification

to commissions for this task. To the extent that resources are not
available, neither the public nor171the private interest would be
served by extending jurisdiction.
The answer may be found in a middle ground approach: public
service commissions should be granted limited jurisdiction over
all public utility holding company operations to the extent that
non-utility operations affect utility operations. Public service
commissions must be able to respond effectively to unexpected
and possibly detrimental creativity on the part of public utility
holding companies, such as that exemplified in Peoples Energy
Corp.172 This approach considers both the public's need for safe173
guards and the utilities' need for enhanced business opportunity.
Public utility statutes should provide for public service commission jurisdiction over any proposed reorganizations, so that predivestiture transfers of utility assets can be avoided or, at least,
remedied. 174 The proponents of the reorganization should have
to both demonstrate that the reorganization will not harm the
public interest and explain the impact of reorganization on public utility services.
In establishing jurisdiction of public service commissions,
states should allow them access to the books, records,
and accounts of public utility holding companies. This access
will allow the public service commission to examine the structure
and strategies of the utilities and their subsidiaries. This will
also help the public service commissions to assure that utilities
are not cross-subsidizing sister subsidiaries; that the level of
investment in non-utility subsidiaries is not detrimental to the
utilities' ability to provide optimum services at the lowest possible rates; that common costs are being equitably allocated; that
utility personnel are not working for non-utility operations; that
public utility services are not eroding; and, generally, that the
public is being adequately served despite the holding company

171. 1982 REPORT, supra note 1, at 29.
The office of the chief economist of the wisconsin Public Service Commission has suggested the following range of regulatory responses to creation of public utility holding
companies: regulate only the utility as before; monitor utility holding company transactions; monitor all holding company actions; or regulate the holding company as a public
utility. J. MALKO, G. ENHOLM & T. JADITZ, supra note 1, at 45.

172.
173.
174.

See supra notes 72-100 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 16-17 and 25-27.
See supra notes 118-148 and accompanying text.
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arrangement. 175 If the public is being disserved, public service
commissions should have the authority to order any necessary
and reasonable remedial measures, including an order for the
dissolution of the holding company.
If the Illinois Commerce Commission had possessed this range
of jurisdiction over Peoples Energy Corporation,the Commission
would have been able to monitor a reorganization that clearly
affected utilities and ratepayers. PEC would have had to demonstrate that the divestiture was in the public interest and address
charges that public utility services would falter after the diversification. Similarly, in American Natural Resources Co., the
Michigan Public Service Commission would have been able to
address adequately the divestiture of Michigan Consolidated
Gas Company to prevent the detrimental transfer of valuable
utility assets prior to reorganization. In the Rochester Telephone
case, the New York Public Service Commission's decision protected the public interest in the short run by refusing the utility's
request to form a holding company. Nevertheless, it provided no
framework to guide future regulation of public utility holding
company diversification. Finally, Connecticut's Public Utility
175. The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) undertook a study of utility diversification in 1982. After a detailed study of diversification of
electric, gas, telephone and water utilities, NARUC issued recommendations including
these and other additional suggestions for regulatory bodies to consider. 1982 REPORT,
supra note 1, at 80-83.
On March 10, 1982, the State of New Mexico enacted an act designed to guard against
some of the dangers of utility diversification. 1982 N.M. LAWS 109. The act provides that
state public service commission can require a public utility holding company to produce
books and records as necessary to enable the commission to determine whether the transaction in question might adversely affect the public utility (§ 62-6-17(B)). The statute
stipulates that the information obtained can be used only to determine the transaction's
impact on the utility (§ 62-6-17(C)). The act makes disclosure of confidential or proprietary information a misdemeanor punishable by fine (§ 62-6-17(E)). § 62-6-19(D) gives the
commission the authority to issue orders necessary to assure against cross-subsidization
or improper cost allocation.
In 1982, the State of Maine amended its statute to subject public utility diversification
to comprehensive public utility commission review. See 1982 ME. Ac'rs 672. The act's
definition of "reorganization" leaves open to determination by the state public utility
commission what "public utility actions" constitute reorganization. (§ 104-1(B-1)). The act
provides that reorganizations must be approved (§ 104-3(A)) and that commission approval of public utility reorganization is to be conditioned on considerations including: (1)
the right of the commission to reasonable access to the books and records of the utility
and any of the utility's affiliates (§ 104-3(A)(1)); (2) the authority to approve or disapprove
transactions between affiliates (§ 104-3(A)(2)); (3) assurance that public utility service will
not be impaired (§ 104-3(A)(4)); (4) assurance that reasonable limitations will be placed on
non-utility investments (§ 104-3(A)(7)); and (5) the right of the commission to order divestiture of the utility if necessary (§ 104-3(A)(8)).
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Control Authority exercised a measure of protective jurisdiction
over Southern Connecticut Gas Company's diversification, but,
again, stopped short of a regulatory framework for addressing
future utility diversification and pre-diversification activity.
Public service commission jurisdiction that extends over less
than all of the elements of public utility diversification is inadequate to the task. On the other hand, public service commission
jurisdiction need not interfere with non-utility operations having
only an inconsequential effect on the utility and its ratepayers.
Given the appropriate jurisdiction, public service commissions
can adapt to utility business changes and learn from experience
what sort of public utility holding company transactions require
administrative review.

CONCLUSION

Utility diversification is in many instances a prudent business
decision, and the creation of a holding company to facilitate that
diversification is an increasingly favored strategy. Accordingly,
state public utility law must change adequately to address the
evolving utility business. The problem comes in striking the
proper balance between protecting the public interest and perlitting utilities to explore other business opportunities. An attempt to create state administrative jurisdiction over all aspects
of the non-utility ventures of public utility holding companies
would be counter-productive, because public service commissions
have neither the expertise nor the need to pass judgment on multifarious non-utility business decisions. Yet, public service commissions must have the authority to ensure that ratepayers are
not disserved by the creation of public utility holding companies.
The most judicious course considers both sides' interests. Public
service commissions should be permitted sufficient jurisdiction to
oversee utility reorganizations and to have access to holding
company books and records. This may ensure that utilities and
their ratepayers are not the pawns of utility reorganizations, but
rather, the beneficiaries.
JOAN

G. FICKINGER

